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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
In late 2000, Plaintiff-Appellant Silicon Ore International, LLC ("SIO") went into 
business processing and selling silica tailings, which are a byproduct of mining operations at a 
Soda Springs quartzite quarry of Defendant-Respondent Monsanto Company ("Monsanto"). At 
that time, Defendant-Respondent Washington Group International, Inc. ("Washington Group"), 
on whose behalf this brief is submitted, was operating the quarry, as it had done for many years 
under its Quartzite Agreement with Monsanto. SIO gained the right to do business at the quarry 
under its Master Agreement with Washington Group because Washington Group separately had 
obtained Monsanto's contractual blessing for SIO's presence at the quarry in an addendum to the 
Quartzite Agreement. Thus, a two-tiered contractual structure was in place, similar to that which 
is often used for construction projects (where an owner hires a general contractor, which in tum 







SIO's presence at the quarry over the years offered little benefit to Monsanto and 
Washington Group. In fact, it was more trouble than it was worth. Consequently, in late 2007-
more than two years after the expiration of SIO's five year contractual right to conduct business 
at the quarry-Washington Group gave SIO notice that it must vacate the quarry. SIO wanted to 
stay and asked Monsanto to overrule Washington Group, but Monsanto would not do so. 
Tax returns prove that SIO lost money every year it operated at the quarry. Nevertheless, 
SIO sued Monsanto and Washington Group on a variety of contract and tort theories, contending 
it was wrongfully made to leave the quarry shortly before it supposedly would have enjoyed a 
truly remarkable change for the better in its financial fortunes. Headlining SIO's claims against 
Monsanto is a claim that--contrary to the two-tiered contractual structure in place-Monsanto 
had an oral contractual obligation to allow SIO to remain at the quarry indefinitely. SIO's main 
claim against Washington Group is for tortious interference with Monsanto's performance of that 
alleged contractual obligation. Despite that its business was a proven money-loser, SIO claims 
its ouster from the quarry resulted in $25 million in lost profits. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
SIO filed this action on December 31, 2009. (R. Vol. 1, p. 1.) Its complaint included 
four claims against Monsanto and two claims against Washington Group. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1-20.) 
The lead claim was that Monsanto breached an oral contract it allegedly made with SIO 
in May 2000, which required it to furnish silica tailings in quantities to be separately agreed for 
SIO to process at the quarry, in return for which SIO would pay royalties at a rate to be 
separately agreed. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 3-4, 10.) The alleged oral contract entitled SIO to conduct 
business at the quarry for so long as doing so was "mutually beneficial"-a standard that would 
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be satisfied if SIO followed Monsanto's environmental rules, paid royalties as separately agreed, 
and sold processed silica tailings only in markets approved by Monsanto. (R. Vol. 1, p. 4.) SIO 
claimed that Monsanto had no right to terminate the alleged oral contract while it was "mutually 
beneficial" under that standard. (R. Vol. 1, p. 10.) 
SIO's three other claims against Monsanto also revolved around the notion that Monsanto 
had no right to require SIO to vacate the quarry. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 11-16.) SIO claimed that the 
alleged oral contract's termination violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
as well as that Monsanto was estopped-under the doctrines of both equitable estoppel and 
quasi-estoppel-from making sro leave the quarry while its presence there was "mutually 
beneficial." (R. Vol. 1, pp. 11-16.) 
The first of SI O's two claims against Washington Group was that Washington Group 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law into the December 1, 2000 
Master Agreement between Washington Group and SIO. (R. Vol. 1, p. 16.) The Master 
Agreement (R. Vol. 3, pp. 318-27) set the terms under which SIO could conduct business at the 
quarry. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 4-5.) SIO could not point to any breach of the Master Agreement's 
express terms, but claimed that Washington Group hindered SIO's work at the quarry and 
conspired with Monsanto to take over SI O's business, in breach of the attendant implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 1, p. 16.) 
SIO also claimed that Washington Group committed tortious interference with the 
alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 17-18.) The factual basis for that claim was the 
same as for the implied-covenant claim: Washington Group allegedly hindered SIO's work at 
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the quarry, and it allegedly persuaded or conspired with Monsanto to remove SIO from the 
quarry so that it could take over SIO's business. (R. Vol. 1, p. 17.) 
After SI 0 took several depositions of current and former Monsanto and Washington 
Group personnel (R. Vol. 4, pp. 501-26, 568-655), Monsanto and Washington Group moved for 
summary judgment. (R. Vo 1. 1, pp. 79-81, Vol. 2, pp. 24 7-49.) Monsanto argued, among other 
things, that (1) the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract was too indefinite and uncertain to constitute 
an actual contract, (2) it was voidable under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") statute of 
frauds because it was an oral contract for the sale of goods (i.e., silica tailings) valued at more 
than $500, and (3) SIO could not prove damages. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 89-94.) Washington Group 
made arguments parallel to Monsanto's first and third arguments, plus it argued that SIO's 
implied-covenant claim ran contrary to the Master Agreement's express terms and that the 
interference claim was untenable to the extent it alleged mere hindrances of SIO's performance 
not resulting in a breach of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 256-63.) 
SIO, of course, opposed the motions for summary judgment. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-408.) 
Part of its opposition was an affidavit by a proffered accounting expert, who opined that SIO' s 
ouster from the quarry resulted in lost profits of more than $25 million. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 409-36.) 
On September 21, 2011, the district court issued a decision granting the motions for 
summary judgment. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 777-98.) 
The district held the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract unenforceable under the UCC statute 
of frauds, without reaching Monsanto's argument that it was too indefinite and uncertain to be an 
actual contract in the first place. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 786-89.) On that basis, the district court granted 
summary judgment against SI O's claims for breach of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract and its 
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 5, p. 789.) Further, the district court 
granted summary judgment to Monsanto on SIO's estoppel claims, finding no evidence 
Monsanto had made false representations or changed positions. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 789-92.) 
As to SIO's implied-covenant claim against Washington Group, the district court held 
that SIO failed to offer any evidence ofrecoverable damages. (R. Vol. 5, pp.795-97.) Although 
Washington Group's alternative argument (that the implied-covenant claim ran contrary to the 
Master Agreement's express terms) offered the district court an opportunity to reach the same 
result on more than one ground, the district court did not take that opportunity. Instead, without 
meaningful explanation, it did not accept that alternative argument. (R. Vol. 5, p. 795.) 
Finally, as to SIO's interference claim, the district court did not reach the arguments 
Washington Group offered. Instead, the district court granted summary judgment on the ground 
that the record contained no evidence Washington Group knew of the alleged SIO/Monsanto 
contract, with which it allegedly had interfered. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 793-94.) 
The district court's complete grant of summary judgment to Monsanto and Washington 
Group was made final in ajudgment entered on October 7, 2011. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 799-801.) SIO 
filed its notice of appeal on November 18, 2011. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 802-07.) 
On March 9, 2012, the district court entered a decision awarding Monsanto $78,072.42 
and Washington Group $86,481.83 in costs and attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
(Addendum A, infra.) A corresponding judgment was entered on March 20, 2012. (Addendum 
B, infra. I) 
On June 12, 2012, Washington Group moved to augment the record with the district court's 
decision and judgment awarding costs and attorney fees. That motion is pending. 
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C. Statement Of Facts. 
Monsanto's corporate family owns a quartzite mine in Soda Springs. (R. Vol. 2, p. 138.) 
In 1993, Monsanto signed a Quartzite Agreement under which the mine would be operated by a 
Washington Group predecessor (Conda Mining Inc.) through the end of2002. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 
139, 145-72, 174-75.) The Quartzite Agreement calls the mine the "Quarry" (R. Vol. 2, p. 145), 
and that is what it will be called for the balance of this brief. The quartzite rock yielded by the 
Quarry is commonly called "silica." (R. Vol. 2, p. 138.) Operating the Quarry involves crushing 
and screening silica, each year generating more than 100,000 tons of silica sand as a byproduct. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 138-39.) 
SIO approached Monsanto in early 2000 about buying the Quarry's silica-sand byproduct 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 140), which will be called "silica tailings" in this brief. Three-way discussions 
between SIO, Monsanto, and Washington Group were held on that subject. (Id.) In May 2000, 
SIO proposed a twenty year written contract to Monsanto, under which Monsanto's silica tailings 
would be sold to SIO and space at the quartzite mine would be rented to SIO, so that SIO could 
process the silica tailings through Washington Group. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 140, 237-38.) Monsanto 
and SIO, however, never entered into any such contract. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 140.) 
Instead, the parties created a two-tiered contractual structure. 
The first contractual tier comprised the preexisting Quartzite Agreement between 
Monsanto and Washington Group's predecessor, augmented by a new addendum between 
Monsanto and Washington Group dated November 29, 2000. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 139, 174-75.) The 
addendum provided that Washington Group may build a facility at the Quarry for processing 
silica tailings. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 174.) In return, Washington Group would pay Monsanto a royalty 
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of $13 .00 per ton of silica tailings provided by Monsanto and sold by Washington Group. (Id.) 
The addendum noted that Washington Group "anticipates entering into one or more contracts 
with [SIO]" related to processing silica tailings at the Quarry, and it listed certain terms any such 
contracts must have for Monsanto's protection (R. Vol. 2, pp. 175)-protections for which 
Monsanto could have contracted with SIO directly, had there been any contract between SIO and 
Monsanto. 
The second contractual tier comprised a Master Agreement dated December 1, 2000, 
between Washington Group and SIO. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 318-27.) Under the Master Agreement, 
SIO would pay Washington Group to construct a facility at the Quarry for processing silica 
tailings. (R. Vol. 3, p. 318.) Washington Group would provide silica tailings to SIO, in return 
for SI O's payment to Washington Group of a per-ton fee set based on the royalty Washington 
Group in tum was required to pay Monsanto. (R. Vol. 3, p. 319.) In addition, while Washington 
Group would "dry, screen and bag the silica sand" (and otherwise operate the facility) for SIO in 
return for payment on a time-and-materials basis, SIO itself would "provide all necessary plant 
equipment to dry, screen and bag the silica sand." (Id.) Of crucial importance, the Master 
Agreement provided that it "shall remain in full force and effect for a period of five years, unless 
otherwise agreed in writing by the parties." (R. Vol. 3, p. 321.) In other words, SIO contracted 
for the right to conduct business at the Quarry not a day longer than through December 1, 2005. 
With that two-tiered contractual structure in place, SIO began doing business at the 
Quarry, starting with facilities construction in 2001 and actual processing of silica tailings 
beginning in early 2002. (R. Vol. 4, p. 650, Vol. 5 at 721.) 
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Not long after SIO began doing business at the Quarry, the first-tier contract was 
replaced, without change to the second-tier contract. Specifically, the Quartzite Agreement and 
the addendum were replaced by a second Quartzite Agreement (dated September 24, 2001) and a 
second addendum (dated March 1, 2002), whose terms closely followed the original versions. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 177-96.) One change, however, was that a wholly owned Monsanto subsidiary, 
P4 Production, LLC ("P4"), replaced Monsanto as Washington Group's contractual counterpart 
because P4 owned the Quarry. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 137-38, Vol. 4, p. 589.) The royalty structure also 
was modified. (R. Vol. 2, p. 196.) Finally, the arrangement's term, which had been set to expire 
at the end of2002, was extended through the end of2007. (R. Vol. 2, p. 180.) 
As 2007 drew to a close, Washington Group notified SIO that it would terminate the 
Master Agreement as of January 1, 2008, and SIO must leave the Quarry. (R. Vol. 2, p. 218.) 
The Master Agreement had expired on December 1, 2005. (R. Vol. 3, p. 321.) But Washington 
Group and SIO had agreed to new pricing terms for the years 2006 and 2007, effectively 
extending the Master Agreement on a year-to-year basis during those years, albeit without 
renewing it for any longer term. (R. Vol. 2, p. 218.) 
SIO demanded that Monsanto reverse Washington Group's directive to vacate the 
Quarry. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 721-23.) In fact, SIO contended it had an oral contract with Monsanto, 
"reached before Washington Group came into the picture," under which Monsanto was obligated 
to allow SIO to remain at the Quarry. (R. Vol. 5, p. 722.) The alleged oral contract dated back 
to May 2000. (R. Vol. 1, p. 3.) It supposedly required Monsanto to furnish SIO with silica 
tailings in quantities to be separately agreed, and to allow SIO to process them at the Quarry, in 
return for SIO's payment ofroyalties at rates to be separately agreed. (R. Vol. 3, p. 438.) This 
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supposed arrangement would last indefinitely: for so long as SIO's operations at the Quarry 
were "mutually beneficial" to SIO and Monsanto. (Id.) According to SIO, its operations at the 
Quarry would be deemed "mutually beneficial" if it followed Monsanto's environmental rules, 
paid Monsanto royalties as separately agreed, and sold processed silica tailings only in markets 
approved by Monsanto. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-39.) 
In early 2008, after being told to leave the Quarry, SIO was able to extract a modicum of 
support for its indefinite-oral-contract theory in e-mails from former Monsanto engineer Mitchell 
Hart. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 244-46.) But in December 2000, only seven months after the alleged May 
2000 oral contract was made, SIO had told Hart in writing that it was "pleased" Monsanto's 
"intent seems to be a long-term relationship," without asserting that Monsanto already had bound 
itself to a contract of indefinite duration. (R. Vol. 3, p. 449.) 
In any event, Monsanto was not cowed by SIO's claim that some vague oral contract 
undermined the two-tiered contractual structure to which the parties had committed themselves 
in writing. Monsanto notified SIO that its normal business operations at the Quarry must cease 
by April 29, 2008, after which point it had until June 30, 2008, to remove its processing facility 
and equipment from the Quarry. (R. Vol. 2, p. 231.) SIO ceased operations and eventually 
removed its processing facility and equipment from the Quarry, although not by the June 30, 
2008 deadline imposed by Monsanto. (R. Vol. 2, p. 141, Vol. 4, p. 609.) Silica tailings have not 
been processed at the Quarry ever since. (R. Vol. 2, p. 141, 167.) 
It is little wonder that the days of processing silica tailings at the Quarry are over. 











(R. Vol. 3, pp. 296-301, 339-40.) 










ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Can the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington Group on 
SI O's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing be affirmed on the 
alternative ground that, as a matter of law, Washington Group had no implied duty under the 
Master Agreement to furnish one of its own screens to SIO? 
2. Can the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington Group on 
SIO's claim for tortious interference be affirmed on the alternative ground that, as a matter of 
law, the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is not actually a contract? 
3. Can the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington Group on 
SIO's claim for tortious interference be partially affirmed on the alternative ground that, as a 
matter of law, mere hindrance of SI O's performance not causing it to breach the alleged 
SIO/Monsanto contract is not actionable? 
4. Does section 16 of the Master Agreement entitle Washington Group to recover 
attorney fees on appeal? 
- 10 -
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A. Standard Of Review. 
This Court's standard ofreview is the same as the standard the district court was required 
to apply in deciding Washington Group's motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Chandler v. 
Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485, 488 (2009). Under that standard, the moving party 
bears the burden of proving-in the first instance-that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Id. at 769, 215 P.3d at 489. Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party 
to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists after all. Id. To satisfy that ultimate burden, 
the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e)). This requires more than "a 
mere scintilla of evidence" that creates only "slight doubt as to the facts." Van v. Portneuf Med. 
Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
B. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against SIO's Claim 
That Washington Group Breached The Master Agreement's Implied Covenant Of 
Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
SIO claimed that Washington Group breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
implied by law into the Master Agreement. (R. Vol. 1, p. 16.) The district court granted 
summary judgment to Washington Group on that claim, holding that SIO failed to offer any 
evidence ofrecoverable damages. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 795-97.) 
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On appeal, SIO contends the district court overlooked one solitary item of damages 
evidence: Washington Group charged SIO "between $125,000 and $150,000" to fabricate a new 
screen for SIO, when Washington Group could have inexpensively modified one of its existing 
screens to meet SIO's needs. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 33.) The implied-covenant claim 
initially was broader than whether Washington Group was required to provide one of its own 
screens to SIO (R. Vol. 1, p. 16), but it is now reduced to that screen issue, as SIO does not 
challenge in any other way the district court's complete grant of summary judgment against the 
implied-covenant claim. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 32-34.) The appellant's failure to address 
an issue in its opening brief"eliminates consideration of it on appeal." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 
Idaho 105, 108, 982 P.2d 940, 943 (1999). Thus, insofar as the implied-covenant claim is 
concerned, this brief will be confined to the screen issue. 
1. SIO failed to direct the district court to any damages evidence. 
In moving for summary judgment against the implied-covenant claim, Washington Group 
pointed to an overall failure of damages evidence. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 257-59.) SIO's opposition 
memorandum (R. Vol. 3, pp. 390-408) did not even mention the notion that Washington Group 
was obligated to modify one of its own screens and furnish it to SIO. The screen Washington 
Group fabricated for SIO was mentioned, but only to assert that Washington Group "built the 
screen, but it did so in such a slow and inefficient manner that SIO sustained damage as a result." 
(R. Vol. 3, p. 404.) To provide evidence supporting that assertion, SIO cited one of its own 
interrogatory responses (id.), which it had placed in the record deep within the voluminous 
affidavit of its counsel, Daniel K. Brough. (R. Vols. 4-5, pp. 468-723.) In that interrogatory 
response, SIO asserted that Washington Group had charged SIO "between $125,000 and 
- 12 -
02977.0282.4950983.2 
$150,000" for fabricating a new screen instead of simply "modifl:Ying] an existing screen, ... 
which would have cost only a few hundred dollars." (R. Vol. 5, p. 705.) SIO simply failed to 
alert the district court to that evidence. Again, nowhere in its opposition memorandum did SIO 
even mention the notion that Washington Group had charged SIO for fabricating a new screen 
instead of modifying an existing screen at a much lower cost. SIO also failed to present that 
damages theory during the summary-judgment hearing.2 
In granting summary judgment against the implied-covenant claim, the district court 
noted that SIO's opposition memorandum referenced its discovery responses as the source of its 
damages evidence. (R. Vol. 5, p. 797.) The district court then correctly pronounced the 
supposed evidence contained in those discovery responses, as SIO had explained that evidence in 
its opposition memorandum (R. Vol. 3, p. 404-05), to be "only conclusory in nature" and 
therefore insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. (R. Vol. 5, p. 797.) SIO 
cannot fairly blame the district court for that outcome. By filing an opposition memorandum in 
which it did not even mention the damages evidence to which it now directs this Court, SIO 
waived the right to claim the district court erred by failing to consider that evidence. 
2 During the summary-judgment hearing, SIO presented a damages theory that is decidedly 
different from the one it advances on appeal. There, SIO argued it did not need a screen at 
all, but received the totally unnecessary screen in an improper forced sale, so the screen's 
entire cost was recoverable as damages. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 69-70.) The district court did not 
mention that theory in its decision, but was right not to accept it, as it had no evidentiary 
support. In fact, SIO's own interrogatory responses confirmed it needed a screen: "in 
approximately the spring of 2004, SIO needed another screen to continue with its 
operations." (R. Vol. 4, p. 704.) In any event, the theory SIO advances on appeal-that it 
needed a screen, but Washington Group should have modified an existing screen at a low 
cost to SIO instead of fabricating a new one at a higher cost to SIO (Appellant's Opening Br. 
at 33)-was never argued to the district court at any time. 
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In other words, SIO failed to meet its burden, as the non-moving party, to "set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). It was not enough 
for SIO to bury its damages evidence somewhere within the 256-page Brough affidavit, without 
pointing the district court to it and explaining its significance. SIO's approach was no different 
than not offering the evidence at all. "[T]he district court was not required to search the record 
looking for evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. ... '[T]he party opposing the 
summary judgment [was) required to bring that evidence to the court's attention."' Vreeken v. 
Lockwood, Eng'g, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 103-04, 218 P.3d 1150, 1164-65 (2009) (quoting Esser 
Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919, 188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)). 
SIO simply failed to put the district court on notice of the damages evidence on which it 
now relies, and of the argument against summary judgment that it now makes. This Court 
should not save SIO from the natural consequence of that failure. 
2. Summary judgment is proper on the alternative ground that, as a matter of 
law, Washington Group had no implied contractual duty to furnish one of its 
own screens to SIO. 
The absence of damages evidence was not the only ground upon which Washington 
Group sought summary judgment against SIO's implied-covenant claim. Washington Group 
also argued that, as a matter of law, it had no implied contractual duty to furnish one of its own 
screens to SIO, given that the Master Agreement expressly required SIO to obtain any screening 
equipment needed to do business at the Quarry. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 260-61, Vol. 5, pp. 746-48.) The 
district court held, without meaningful explanation, that summary judgment could not be granted 
on that basis. (R. Vol. 5, p. 795.) On that point, the district court was wrong. If this Court is not 
persuaded that the district court's reason for granting summary judgment was correct, it 
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nevertheless may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the alternative ground 
that Washington Group had no implied contractual duty to furnish one of its own screens to SIO. 
See, e.g., Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218, 
177 P .3d 95 5, 965 (2008) ("[W]e can affirm the district court's order granting summary 
judgment on alternate grounds."). 
"The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing obligates parties to cooperate with 
one another and to perform the obligations imposed by their agreements." Huyett v. Idaho State 
Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 910, 104 P .3d 946, 952 (2004 ). It does not impose obligations that are 
contrary to or inconsistent with a contract's express terms. E.g., Idaho Fir st Nat' l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121Idaho266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991). Put differently, "[e]xpress 
terms of a contract may not be overridden by those implied from the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing." Huyett, 140 Idaho at 910, 104 P.3d at 952. 
Under section 3 of the Master Agreement, SIO "agree[ d] to provide all necessary plant 
equipment tc;> dry, screen, and bag the silica sand." (R. Vol. 3, p. 319.) Despite undertaking that 
express obligation, SIO claims Washington Group had an implied obligation to modify one of its 
own screens for SIO, saving SIO the expense of procuring a new screen. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 313-14.) 
Implying such an obligation into the Master Agreement would be an error of law, for it would 
have the effect of overriding SI O's express contractual obligation to provide its own screening 
equipment. SIO's implied-covenant claim is therefore legally untenable. 
In sum, the district court's grant of summary judgment may be affirmed, on either the 
ground the district court granted summary judgment or this alternative ground. 
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C. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment Against SIO's 
Interference Claim, Notwithstanding Its Procedural Error. 
SIO claimed that Washington Group tortiously interfered with the alleged SIO/Monsanto 
contract in two ways: (1) by making it needlessly difficult for SIO itself to perform; and (2) by 
persuading Monsanto to breach. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 17-18.) In seeking summary judgment against 
that claim, Washington Group's primary argument was that SIO could not prove an interference 
claim because the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract was not actually a contract. (R. Vol. 2, p. 259, 
Vol. 5, pp. 743-44.) Washington Group also argued that partial summary judgment was 
appropriate to the extent the claimed interference was hindering SIO's performance without 
causing SIO to breach. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 259-60, Vol. 5, pp. 744-46.) The district court granted 
summary judgment to Washington Group, but did so without discussing either of those proffered 
grounds for summary judgment. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 793-94.) 
Instead, the district court granted summary judgment sua sponte on another ground: the 
record contained no evidence that Washington Group knew of the alleged SIO/Monsanto 
contract. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 793-94.) Washington Group's knowledge of the alleged SIO/Monsanto 
contract is, of course, an element of SI O's interference claim. See, e.g., Wesco Autobody Supply, 
Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 895, 243 P.3d 1069, 1083 (2010). SIO contends on appeal, 
however, that the district court was not empowered to grant summary judgment sua sponte based 
on a failure of evidence on that element, as SIO had not been put on notice that it was at issue on 
summary judgment. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 27-30.) In other words, SIO argues the district 
court made a procedural error. Washington Group will concede that point. 
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Nevertheless, for two reasons, this Court can and should affirm in full the district court's 
grant of summary judgment. First, the procedural error was harmless. The reason it was 
harmless is that SIO is incapable of offering evidence that Washington Group knew of the 
alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. Second, summary judgment is proper on the primary ground 
Washington Group sought it: that the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract was not actually a 
contract. Finally, even if this Court concludes that it cannot affirm in full on those grounds, it 
can affirm in part, as SIO's interference claim is invalid to the extent it alleges mere hindrance of 
SIO's performance not resulting in a breach. 
1. SIO is incapable of offering evidence that Washington Group knew of the 
alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish judicial errors that are harmless from 
those that are not: "no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by 
the court ... is ground for ... vacating modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice." 
I.R.C.P. 61. Consequently, "[t]his Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is 
harmless." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004). 
The district court may have erred by granting Washington Group summary judgment on a theory 
it had not raised, but the error was harmless because SIO has shown that it is incapable of 
offering the kind of proof the district court found to be lacking. 
A plaintiff in SIO' s position-having suffered a sua sponte grant of summary judgment 
on grounds that the record contained no evidence to support an element of its claim-might 
move for reconsideration. In connection with such a motion, the plaintiff might ( 1) identify any 
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relevant evidence the district court overlooked, (2) offer additional relevant evidence, and/or (3) 
ask for more time to discover relevant evidence. SIO did not, however, seek reconsideration. 
Instead, it filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, it contends the district court overlooked relevant 
evidence already in the record (Appellant's Opening Br. at 31-32), without saying it could offer 
more evidence on remand if given the chance, or wants another try at discovering more evidence. 
That choice is puzzling, given that, as shown in the next few paragraphs, the record does not 
substantiate Washington Group's supposed knowledge of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. 
To the contrary, John Rosenbaum-the only Washington Group witness deposed, and the person 
in charge of its operations at the quarry (R. Vol. 4, p. 643)-unequivocally testified that he did 
not know of any agreement between SIO and Monsanto. (R. Vol. 4, p. 650.) In any event, by 
adopting that posture, SIO makes clear that it is content to stand pat and hope this Court will 
disagree with the district court as to whether the record contains evidence that Washington 
Group knew of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. 
SIO contends Washington Group's knowledge of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is 
evidenced by the March 1, 2002 addendum (R. Vol. 2, pp. 194-96) to the second Quartzite 
Agreement (R. Vol. 2, pp. 177-93)-the one Washington Group and Monsanto subsidiary P4 
signed after SIO's work at the Quarry had begun. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 31.) SIO seems 
to think the addendum demonstrates that knowledge simply because its subject matter is SIO's 
presence at the Quarry. That conclusion does not follow. The addendum simply shows that 
Washington Group and P4 agreed between themselves on terms governing SIO's presence at the 
Quarry, just as Washington Group and Monsanto had done in their November 29, 2000 
addendum to the first Quartzite Agreement. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 174-75.) The two nearly identical 
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addenda each contemplated Washington Group's "entering into one or more contracts with 
[SIO]" relating to processing sand at the Quarry. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 175, 195.) Tellingly, both listed 
certain terms that "[a]ny such contracts" must have for Monsanto's or P4's protection. (Id.) Had 
Monsanto contracted with SIO, it could have obtained whatever protections it needed directly 
from SIO, without having to require Washington Group to obtain them indirectly. Consequently, 
the addendum is inconsistent with the notion that Washington Group knew SIO had a contract 
with Monsanto entitling it to conduct business at the Quarry indefinitely. 
The addenda to the two Quartzite Agreements evidence the mutual intent of Monsanto/P4 
and Washington Group to establish a two-tiered contractual structure: Monsanto/P4 with 
Washington Group, and Washington Group with SIO. SIO cannot explain why such a structure 
should have let Washington Group know about the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. As the 
district court observed, "[ c ]ertainly there is no legal requirement that there be an independent 
contract between Monsanto and SIO to facilitate this arrangement" and, consequently, there is no 
reason for Washington Group to presume that one existed. (R. Vol. 5, p. 794.) 
The other items of evidence to which SIO points (Appellant's Opening Br. at 31) also fail 
to evidence Washington Group's knowledge of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. Each is 
merely evidence that at times SIO, Washington Group, and Monsanto would discuss a royalty 
structure and incorporate it into both the Monsanto/Washington Group agreement and the 
Washington Group/SIO agreement. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 464-66, Vol. 4, pp. 649, 656.) While SIO 
relies on testimony of Washington Group's John Rosenbaum that such royalty discussions 
occurred, SIO fails to note that Rosenbaum unequivocally testified that he did not know of any 
agreement between SIO and Monsanto. (R. Vol. 4, p. 650.) 
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The district court was right: the record contained no evidence that Washington Group 
knew of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. Indeed, SIO's Todd Sullivan wrote in an April 
2008 e-mail (R. Vol. 5, pp. 721-23) that the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract dates back to a time 
"before Washington Group came into the picture." (R. Vol. 5, p. 722.) SIO has no explanation 
for how Washington Group could have known about an alleged oral contract, made before it 
came into the picture, entitling SIO to conduct business at the Quarry indefinitely. 
So, while it may have been procedural error for the district court to grant summary 
judgment on a ground not raised by Washington Group, the error was harmless, as SIO cannot 
prove Washington Group knew of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. From a "harmless error" 
standpoint, this case is like Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011). 
There, Taylor filed a motion under I.R.C.P. 56(f) for more time to respond to the defendants' 
motion for partial summary judgment. The district court denied Taylor's motion and granted 
partial summary judgment to the defendants, and Taylor appealed. This Court affirmed, holding 
both that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor's motion and that, in any 
event, any error was harmless under I.R.C.P. 61 because "Taylor fails to point to any information 
that might have been discovered that could change the outcome of the partial summary 
judgment, so he has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice." Id. at 572-73, 261 P.3d at 
849-50. Like Taylor, SIO provides no reason to believe it could overcome the evidentiary 
shortfall if given the opportunity. If the district court's grant of summary judgment were 
reversed, on remand SIO could not avoid summary judgment on the same ground the district 
court has already granted it. This Court need not reverse and remand because of a procedural 
error when the same substantive result is assured on remand. 
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2. Summary judgment is proper on the alternative ground that, as a matter of 
law, the alleged SIG/Monsanto contract is not actually a contract. 
The existence of a contract is, of course, an element of SI 0' s interference claim. See, 
e.g., Wesco Autobody, 149 Idaho at 895, 243 P.3d at 1083. As noted above, Washington Group 
sought summary judgment against SIO's interference claim on the ground that the alleged 
SIO/Monsanto contract, with which Washington Group supposedly interfered, is too indefinite 
and uncertain to actually be a contract. (R. Vol. 2, p. 259, Vol. 5, pp. 743-44.) To make that 
argument, Washington Group incorporated by reference Monsanto's arguments to that effect, 
which Monsanto made in seeking summary judgment against SIO's claim that Monsanto 
breached the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract. (R. Vol. 1, 90-94, Vol. 5, pp. 730-31.) The district 
court did not decide whether the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is actually a contract because it 
disposed of SI O's breach claim by deeming the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract unenforceable 
under the UCC statute of frauds. (R. Vol. 5, p. 786.) While the district court made an offhand 
observation that it may well have allowed the contract-or-not-a-contract issue to reach the jury 
had reaching that issue on summary judgment been necessary (id), a careful analysis reveals that 
SIO cannot possibly prove the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is actually a contract. Even 
assuming arguendo that SIO and Monsanto orally agreed to terms just as SIO says, the resulting 
accord would not actually be a contract because of its indefiniteness on two crucial terms: pnce 
and quantity. 
The price term of the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is that "SIO would pay Monsanto 
royalties in agreed-upon amounts" for silica tailings furnished by Monsanto. (R. Vol. 3, p. 438.) 
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In other words, SIO admits the royalty rates were left open for future agreement. Consequently, 
the alleged oral SIO/Monsanto contract is not really a contract at all: 
To be enforceable, a contract must provide a price or a 
means of determining the price. If the parties provide a 
practicable, objective method of determining the price of 
compensation, not leaving it to the future will of the parties 
themselves, there is no such indefiniteness or uncertainty as will 
prevent the agreement from being an enforceable contract. At the 
very least, the parties must specify in the agreement a practicable 
method by which the price can be determined by the court without 
any new expression by the parties themselves. 
Bauchman-Kingston P'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 93, 233 P.3d 18, 24 (2008) 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also Traylor v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 99 
Idaho 560, 562, 585 P .2d 970, 972 (1978) ("In the absence of an agreement between the parties 
regarding the amount to be paid to Traylor, there was failure to agree on an essential term of the 
contract. Such an agreement is too indefinite to enforce."). The alleged SIO/Monsanto contract 
specifies neither a price nor a practical, objective method of determining a price. Instead, it 
impermissibly leaves the price to be determined by the parties' future will. SIO argued below 
that setting the price through its December 1, 2000 Master Agreement with Washington Group 
was good enough (R. Vol. 3, p. 381), but the Master Agreement did not even exist in May 2000, 
when the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract was made. (R. Vol. 1, p. 3.) Accordingly, the Master 
Agreement does not help SIO avoid the conclusion that the alleged SIO/Monsanto agreement left 
price to the parties' future will and therefore is not an actual contract. 
Also left open for future agreement was the quantity term: "Monsanto would furnish SIO 
with certain agreed-upon quantities of sand .... " (R. Vol. 3, p. 438.) An agreement with an 
open quantity term is too indefinite to be enforced as a contract. Dale's Serv. Co. v. Jones, 96 
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Idaho 662, 665, 534 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1975) ("This clause does not establish with sufficient 
definiteness and clarity the quantity of fill that T & J were expected to provide. A party will not 
be subjected to a contractual obligation, where the character of that obligation is so indefinite and 
uncertain as to its terms and requirements that it is impossible to state with reasonable certainty 
the obligation involved."). 
That said, failure to specify quantity is not always an agreement's death knell. The UCC 
enforces requirements contracts, which "measure[] the quantity by ... the requirements of the 
buyer." Idaho Code§ 28-2-306(1). A requirements contract "is not too indefinite since it is held 
to mean the actual good faith ... requirements of the [buyer]." Idaho Code§ 28-2-306 cmt. 2. 
Even SIO, however, does not contend the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract is a requirements 
contract. Instead, SIO merely argued to the district court that the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract 
"is not so very different from a simple, and common, requirements contract." (R. Vol. 3, p. 3 81.) 
The difference, however, is legally crucial. SIO did not agree to buy its requirements for silica 
tailings from Monsanto. Even under its version of the facts, all it agreed to do was buy silica 
tailings from Monsanto in quantities to be agreed in the future. That promise is illusory because 
an obligation "to buy all that the buyer wishes or may thereafter choose to order" leaves the 
quantity to be bought "exclusively to the will of the [buyer]." 2 Joseph M. Perillo & Helen 
Hadjiyannakis Bender, Corbin on Contracts§ 6.5 (rev. ed. 1993). By contrast, with a true 
requirements contract, the buyer's promise is not illusory because the buyer is obligated to buy 
from the seller in accordance with the buyer's "objective need for the commodity." Id. 
SIO's obligations under the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract are so indefinite and illusory 
that it is not actually a contract. For that reason, an interference claim predicated on it fails as a 
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matter of law. Consequently, even if this Court concludes that Washington Group was not 
entitled summary judgment on the grounds employed by the district court, the district court's 
award of summary judgment nevertheless can be affirmed on alternative grounds. 
3. Partial summary judgment is proper on the alternative ground that, as a 
matter of law, the alleged interference with SIO's performance is not 
actionable because it did not cause SIO to breach. 
If this Court concludes that it cannot affirm in full on either of the two grounds discussed 
above, it nevertheless can affirm in part. SIO claimed that Washington Group committed two 
distinct types of interference with the alleged SIO/Monsanto contract: (1) making it needlessly 
difficult for SIO itself to perform; and (2) persuading Monsanto to breach. (R. Vol. 1, p. 17.) 
But interference with a contract is actionable only if it results in a breach. E.g., Bybee v. Isaac, 
145 Idaho 251, 259, 178 P.3d 616, 624 (2008) (holding that an element of a claim for tortious 
interference with a contract is "intentional interference causing a breach of the contract"). The 
first type of interference therefore is not actionable. SIO claimed only that its performance was 
made needlessly difficult, not that it breached. (R. Vol. 1, p. 17.) In fact, SIO affirmatively 
denied that it breached. (R. Vol. 3, p. 403.) Thus, Washington Group is entitled to partial 
summary judgment to the extent SIO alleged interference with its own contractual performance. 
As noted above, Washington Group moved for partial summary judgment on that ground 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 259-60), but the district court did not reach it. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 744-46, 793-94.) 
The opposing argument SIO made to the district court-that, despite its denial of breaching, SIO 
might eventually have uncovered evidence of a breach (R. Vol. 3, p. 403)-is untenable. 
"'Motions for summary judgment are decided upon facts shown, not upon facts that might have 
been shown."' Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 793, 215 P.3d 505, 513 (2009) 
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(brackets omitted) (quoting Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 
227, 229 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
D. Excluding Mitchell Hart's March 14, 2008 E-Mail From Evidence Was Correct Or, 
At Worst, Harmless Error. 
In opposing the motions for summary judgment filed by Monsanto and Washington 
Group, SIO filed an affidavit by Todd Sullivan, one of its principals. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 437-67.) 
The exhibits to Sullivan's affidavit included three e-mails that Sullivan received from Mitchell 
Hart on January 17, March 6, and March 14of2008, respectively. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 445-48.) Hart 
had been a mining engineer for Monsanto in 2000, when SIO says its alleged contract with 
Monsanto was formed, but he left Monsanto in 2005. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 240-41.) His three e-mails 
were sent in response to Sullivan's attempts to get him to admit-three years after leaving 
Monsanto, and eight years after the fact-that SIO and Monsanto had entered into an oral 
contract. (R. Vol. 3, p. 439.) 
Monsanto moved to strike all three of Hart's e-mails as hearsay. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 752-59.) 
The district court agreed with Monsanto that the e-mails are hearsay. (R. Vol. 5, p. 782.) The 
district court also agreed with Monsanto that the e-mails do not satisfy the residual exception to 
the hearsay rule, I.RE. 803(24), as SIO had argued. (R. Vol. 5, p. 783.) Nevertheless, the 
district court declined to strike the January 17 and March 6 e-mails, as they had been placed into 
the record not only by SIO, but also by Monsanto itself, in an affidavit in which Hart explained 
why he sent them and why he now believed some of their content was incorrect. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 
239-46, Vol. 5, pp. 783, 786.) Consequently, only the March 14 e-mail was stricken as 
inadmissible hearsay. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 786.) 
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SIO contends on appeal that the March 14 e-mail was hearsay, but fits within the residual 
exception, and therefore should not have been stricken. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 34-36.) For 
two reasons, however, the district court's evidentiary ruling should be affirmed. 
First, at least one of the residual exception's conditions is not met. Under the residual 
exception, a court can admit a hearsay statement into evidence if it meets several conditions, one 
of which is that it be "more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." I.R.E. 803(24). Hart's March 14 
e-mail does not meet that condition because it is essentially a reaffirmation and summary of his 
January 17 and March 6 e-mails, which the district court considered. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 783, 786.) 
While SIO suggests the March 14 e-mail bears on whether the alleged SIG/Monsanto contract is 
barred by the UCC statute of frauds (Appellant's Opening Br. at 36), it bears on that issue in the 
same way as the January 17 and March 6 e-mails. The March 14 e-mail is not "more probative" 
on that issue than those e-mails are. In fact, both the March 14 e-mail and the March 6 e-mail 
speak to the sale-of-goods nature of the alleged SIG/Monsanto contract by saying that SIO was 
to pay Monsanto a royalty in return for being "assure[ d] certain volumes of sand." (R. Vol. 3, 
pp. 446-48.) Furthermore, as the district court held, the March 14 e-mail is not more probative 
than sworn testimony from Hart (R. Vol. 5, p. 783), which SIO had obtained and placed into the 
record. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 501-26.) Thus, the district court was correct in holding that the March 14 
e-mail is hearsay that does not satisfy the residual exception. 
Second, even if the district court's holding were erroneous, it would merely be a classic 
example of harmless error. As just discussed, the March 14 e-mail's content is not materially 
different from that of the January 17 and March 6 e-mails. Further, it is not materially different 
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from Sullivan's own affidavit testimony about the terms of the alleged SIG/Monsanto contract. 
(R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-39.) Since the district court considered the January 17 and March 6 e-mails 
(R. Vol. 5, pp. 783, 786), as well as Sullivan's affidavit testimony, no prejudice could have 
arisen from excluding the March 14 e-mail. Excluding the March 14 e-mail was harmless 
because the outcome on summary judgment would have been the same either way. See, e.g., 
I.R.C.P. 61 ("No error in ... the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for ... vacating modifying, 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice."); Taylor, 151 Idaho at 572-73, 261 P.3d at 849-50 
(holding that denying a I.R.C.P. 56(f) motion, if error, was no worse than harmless error under 
I.R.C.P. 61 because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to point to any information that might have been 
discovered that could change the outcome of the partial summary judgment"). SIO certainly 
does not show otherwise. 
E. Washington Group Is Entitled To Recover Attorney Fees On Appeal. 
If this Court affirms the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington 
Group, then on two independent grounds Washington Group is entitled to recover attorney fees 
on appeal. The first is Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)-the district court's basis for awarding attorney 
fees. (Addendum A, pp. 5-7, infra.) The second is section 16 of the Master Agreement. 
1. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) entitles Washington Group to attorney fees. 
The prevailing party in any civil action based on a "commercial transaction" is entitled to 
recover its reasonable attorney fees. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Of course, section 12-120(3) 
"applies on appeal as well as at trial." Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 700, 963 P.2d 
372, 383 (1998). It defines "[t]he term 'commercial transaction' ... to mean all transactions 
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except transactions for personal or household purposes," Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), and it applies 
if the commercial transaction is "integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 
P.3d 594, 599 (2007). So long as that requirement is met, it does not matter whether relief is 
sought on contract theories, tort theories, or both. Id. at 728-29, 152 P.3d at 599-600. In fact, 
"as long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be 
entitled to attorney fees for claims that are fundamentally related to the commercial transaction 
yet sound in tort." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 12.10 ISCR 1, 17 (Apr. 13, 2012). 
The Master Agreement is a "commercial transaction" as defined by section 12-120(3), 
and it plainly is integral to, and the basis for, SIO's implied-covenant claim. Washington Group 
therefore is entitled to attorney fees under section 12-120(3) with respect to that claim. 
Further, with respect to SI O's interference claim, SI O's own theory of the case is that the 
Master Agreement was signed so that Washington Group could administer the alleged 
SIO/Monsanto contract on Monsanto's behalf. (R. Vol. 1, p. 4.) Thus, SIO portrayed the alleged 
SIO/Monsanto contract and the Master Agreement as inextricably intertwined business 
arrangements. For that reason, the Master Agreement not only was "at the center of the lawsuit" 
between SIO and Washington Group, but also is "fundamentally related" to the interference 
claim. Carrillo, 12.10 ISCR at 17. Accordingly, section 12-120(3) applies to the inference 
claim, just as it applies to the implied-covenant claim. 
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Upon affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment, this Court should award 
Washington Group attorney fees on appeal under section 12-120(3 ), just as the district court 
awarded them below.3 (Addendum A, pp. 5-7, infra.) 
2. The Master Agreement entitles Washington Group to attorney fees. 
The Master Agreement furnishes an alternative basis for awarding Washington Group 
attorney fees. Its section 16 provides as follows: 
Any suit, dispute, litigation, action, claim and/or proceedings in 
connection herewith, the subject matter hereof or between the 
parties hereto, will be brought, prosecuted and resolved solely and 
exclusively in the courts of the State of Idaho or the United States 
District Court of Idaho. Each party consents to the personal 
jurisdiction of the State of Idaho of all actions, disputes, litigation, 
claims, suits, and/or proceedings arising out of this Agreement or 
the subject matter hereof, whether based on tort, contract, 
warranty, misrepresentation, fraud, or otherwise. The prevailing 
party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 
(R. Vol. 3, p. 323 (emphasis added).) This is an unusually broad fee provision. It plainly applies 
to SI O's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which arises 
directly under the Master Agreement. It also applies to SIO's claim for tortious interference with 
the alleged SIG/Monsanto contract, even though that claim arises indirectly from, instead of 
directly under, the Master Agreement. Examining section 16' s three sentences, one by one, 
bears out that latter conclusion. 
Section 16's first sentence is a forum-selection clause in favor of Idaho courts. It applies 
to any claim "in connection [with the Master Agreement], the subject matter [of the Master 
3 SIO does not contest the district court's award of attorney fees (Addenda A-B, infra). It 
therefore accedes to the same result for which Washington Group now argues: that section 
12-120(3) applies to this case. An unchallenged result below should obtain on appeal. 
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Agreement], or between the parties [to the Master Agreement]." (Id.) Thus, by its own plain 
language, the forum-selection clause covers more than just claims arising directly under the 
Master Agreement. It extends to "[a]ny ... claim ... between the parties" to the Master 
Agreement. (Id.) The interference claim is subject to the forum-selection clause because it is 
"between the parties" to the Master Agreement: SIO and Washington Group. That claim also is 
subject to the forum-selection clause because it is made in connection with the Master 
Agreement's "subject matter": SIO's business at the Monsanto Quarry. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 318-19.) 
Section 16' s second sentence is a consent-to-jurisdiction-in-Idaho clause that applies to 
any claim "arising out of this Agreement or the subject matter hereof, whether based on tort, 
contract, warranty, misrepresentation, fraud, or otherwise." (R. Vol. 3, p. 323.) Its scope also 
extends well beyond claims arising directly under the Master Agreement. It covers any claim 
arising out of the Master Agreement's "subject matter." As just explained, the interference claim 
arises from the Master Agreement's "subject matter": SIO's business at the Quarry. The 
interference claim therefore also is subject to the consent-to-jurisdiction-in-Idaho clause. 
Section 16's third and final sentence simply states that "[t]he prevailing party shall be 
entitled to reasonable to attorney fees." (Id.) By "prevailing party," it means the party that 
prevailed on a claim within the scope of section 16's forum-selection clause, consent-to-
jurisdiction-in-Idaho clause, or both. No other meaning is possible. Since SIO's interference 
claim is within the scope of the forum-selection clause and the consent-to-jurisdiction-in-Idaho 
clause, it necessarily also is within the scope of the "prevailing party" clause. 
Consequently, section 16 authorizes awarding Washington Group attorney fees with 
respect to not only the implied-covenant claim, but also the interference claim. This Court can 
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rely on it, in addition or in the alternative to section 12-120(3), in awarding Washington Group 
attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Washington 
Group, and it should award Washington Group attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 14th day of June, 2012. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Respondent Washington Group International, Inc. 
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Case No: CV-2009-0000366 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants', Monsanto Company (Monsanto) and 
Washington Group International, Inc, (WGI), respective motions for attorney fees and costs, 
Plaintiff, Silicon lntemational Ore, LLC (SIO), objected to both Monsanto's and WGl's 
requests for attorney fees and costs, filing a memorandum in opposition to both parties' 
motions, This matter 1.-vas argued to the Court on February 10, 2012. Following argument, 
the Court took this matter under advisement. The Cou1t has considered the parties; 
arguments, both set forth in their respective briefing and as presented at oral argument, and 
now issues its Memorandum Decision and Order. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDlNG 
SIO filed its Complaint in this matter on December 31, 2009. SIO's Complaint 
asserted four (4) separate claims for relief against Monsanto and two (2) separate claims 
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for relief against WGI. Both patties moved for summary judgment against SIO and its 
various claims. On September 21, 2011, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (MD&O). The Court's MD&O 
granted summary judgment to both Monsanto and WGI with respect to each of the claims 
SIO asse11ed against them. Judgment was entered pursuant to the MD&O on October 7, 
2011. SIO has appealed from the Comt's Judgment as well as its MD&O dismissing 
Sf O's Complaint and claims for relief against Monsanto and WGL 
Both Monsanto and WGI have requested an awaJd of co.$tS and attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§12-120(3) and 12-121, claiming to be the prevailing parties in 
the litigation pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to the Cou1t's MD&O on smnmary judgment and its subsequent entry of 
Judgment dismissing SIO's claims, both Monsanto and WGI have asserted that they are the 
prevailing party in this litigation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)( l)(B), and thereby are entitled to 
an award of costs pursuant to l.R.C,P. 54(d) and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e) and 
r.c. §§12~120(3) arid 12-121. 
A prerequisite to any award of costs and attorney fees is a detemlination by the Court 
concerning prevailing party status. See Idaho Code §§12-120 and 12-121; and I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l) and (2) and l.R.C.P. 54(e)(I). 
1. Ptevailing Party. 
Monsanto and WGl both claim that they are the prevailing party in their litigation 
with SIO. Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Cow.i must 
utilize the definition found in LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) in detennining whether a litigant is the 
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prevailing party and entitled to an award of attorney fees. l.R.CJ>. 54(d)(l)(B) defines 
prevailing party as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court sh al I in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. 
The trial cou1t in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in prut and did not prevail in part, and npon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner after considering all of the issues and clainlS involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LlC v. Nord Excavafing & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 
719, 117 P.Jd 130, 133 (2005) (Eighteen Mile Ranch), the Idaho Supreme Court held, "in 
litigation, avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a 
plaintiff. 11 Therefore, the Court has little difficulty concluding that both Monsanto and wor 
ere the prevailing parties in their litigation with SI01 having obtained a defense verdict on all 
of the claims SlO brought against them respectively. Neither, Monsanto or WGJ brought a 
counterclaim against SIO, See also Oakes v. Boise Hearl Clinic Physicians PLLC, 2012 WL 
2. Costs. 
Rule 54(d)(l)(A) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Prncedure provides that "except when 
otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the 
prevailing party 01· pa1ties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." 
The Court, having determined that Monsanto and WGI were the prevailing party in 
their litigation with SIO, will now consider Monsanto's and WGI's respective claims for 
costs. 
1SIO has not contested either Monsan10 's or WGI's claim of prevailing party status. 
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Monsanto is seeking $1,143.92 in costs as a matter of right. These costs include a 
$58.00 filing fee to Caribou County District Court (Monsanto's Answer) and deposition 
expenses for four (4) depositions: (l) James R. Smith ($424.23); (2) David Famswo1th 
($384.89);2 (3) Mitchell J. Hart and; (4) John Rosenbaum ($234,50), 
Court filing fees (I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C}l.) and charges for one (1) copy of 
depositions taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of the action 
(I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)IO.) fall within the parameters of Rule 54(d)(l)(C) of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure and are properly characterized as a "cost as a matter of right." 
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Monsanto 1s requested costs in the total amount of 
Similarly, WGI has made a request for the same items of cost. The only difference 
between WGI's claimed costs and Monsanto's is WGI's claim for $125.00 for service of a 
subpoena upon the Southeast ldaho Council of Government. This claimed item of cost 
has not been objected to by sro, and does, on its face, appear to fall within the provision 
of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) subparagraph 2. This subparagraph provides for the recovery of 
"fees [incurred] for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by a 
ptlblic officer or other person." Therefore, the Court will GRANT WGI's claimed costs 
of right in the amount of $1,281.83. 
Neither party has made a request for "discretionary costs" pursuant to I.R.C,P. 
54( d)(l )(D).3 
2D1wid f'nrosworth ond Mitchell J. Hart's deposition costs were combined Into one amount. 
)Monsanto hns Included its claim for attorney fees as M item of discretiooury cost. SIO has devoted a section, in 
Pl~intiff's Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant Monsanto Company's Motion for Order Awll!'ding Allomey Fees 
and Cosls, lo Monsanto's inclusion of attomoy fees llS a discretionary cost item. The Court will im!llyze Monsanlo's 
cl~irn for anorne)' fees sepamtely, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(e) and l.C§§ 12-120(3) And 12-121 - nol l.R.C P. 54(d)( l(D). 
MEMORANDUM DECZSION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND A1TOltNEY 
li'£li:S-4 
Mar. 9. 2012 10:59AM Caribou County Court No. 0146 P. 5/16 
3, Attorney Fees. 
Both Monsanto and SIO seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to l.R.C.P. 
54(e)(1), 54(e)(5), and Idaho Code §12-120(3).4 Pursuant to l.C. §12-120(3)1 the prevailing 
party in a commercial transaction is allowed ''a reasonable attomey' s fee to be set by the 
court.n J.C. §12-120(3) provides as follows: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale 
of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and 
collected as costs, 
J.C. §12-120(3) has also defined a "commercial transaction,, as being "all transactions except 
transactions for petsonal OI' household purposes.11 
A review ofidaho's appellate case law regarding the application of the "commercial 
transaction I) language of J.C. § l 2-120(3) reveals that its definition and application are 
expansive rather than restrictive; Uierefore, the Comt concurs with the argument presented to 
the Court by Monsanto and found in the ldaho Cou1t of Appeals decision in Ericksen v. Blue 
Cross ofldaho Health Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 693, 695, 778 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct.App,1989). 
The evolution of this expansive approach to the definition of "commercial transaction1' is 
most readily and recently established in the Idaho Supreme Coru1 cases of Carri/la v. Boise 
Tire Co., Inc., 2012 WL 666038 (Can·illo); Garner v, Pavey> 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608, 
615 (2011) (Garner); and Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 
(2007) (Blimka), 
~Monsanto and WGI also assen that they ~re entitle(! to nn ftward of nnomcy foes p\lrSllfml lo J.C. § 12· l 21. Because this 
Court co11cludes that the gravamen ofSIO's Complain! and claims involved a claimed commercial mmsnction, th~ Court 
will award Monsanto and WGI !heir reasonable anomey fees pursuant to r.c. § 12-120(3), Therefore, the Court will not 
eng~ge in i;n 11n"lysis ofl.C. § 12-J 21 nnd whether Monsanto and WGI are enlitlcd lo an award of attorney fees and cos ls 
pUrStH\llt to l.C. § 12-121. 
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The analysis a trial court must undertake in determining whether a prevailing party is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. §12-120(3) was addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Comt in Garner. In Garne1·, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a 
commercial transaction for the purpose of I.C. § 12-120(3) is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review, Great P/a;ns, 136 Idaho at 
470, 36 P.3d at 222. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) allows for an award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action to recover "in any 
commercial transaction." A commercial transaction includes all 
transactions except those for personal or household purposes. LC. § 12-
120(3). In determining whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC. 
§ 12-120(3), the Court has conducted a two-step analysis: "(1) there must 
be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim; and (2) the 
commercial transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sotight." 
Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 471, 36 P.3d at 223 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the 
complaint.... [T]he lawsuit and the causes of action must be based on a 
commercial transaction, not simply a situation that can be characterized as 
a con:unercial transaction." Id. ln other words, the relevant inquiry is 
whether the commercial transaction constituted 11the gravamen of the 
lawsuit/' and was the basis on which a pai1y is attempting to recover. Id. at 
472, 36 P.3d at 224. 
259 P.3d at 615. 
In the case at bar, there can be no doubt that this is a commercial transaction as that 
term has been defined by the Idaho Supreme Court in Garner and other Idaho appellate 
decisions. Both prongs of the test enunciated therein are clearly met. A commercial 
transaction was integral to each of SlO's claims against both Monsanto and WGl. 5 Further, 
the commercial transaction was the ve1y basis upon which recovery was being sought. 
\Vith respect to Monsanto, it is of 110 moment that the Court determined that there was no valid or binding ornl co11trnct 
in pince between SJO and Monsanto. Whal triggerS the applicotion of Attorney fees, as ii relates 10 SIO and Monsan10, is 
SIO's claim that there was n valid and enfurceable oral contract in place between it and Monsanto for goods o~her thllll 
for personnl or household purposes. See Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shfrey, 126 rdaho 63, 73, 878 l'.2d 762 772 (1994) 
("Where a party alleges tho existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3 ), as !he 
Shireys h1we done, thal cll'lim triggers the npplicollon of the statute and a prevailing party may recover fees even though 
no linbility under n contrrict was established." Twin Falls Lives took Com111 1t1 Co. \'. Mtrl-Ce11ii{ry bis. Co., 117 Idaho 176, 
I 84, 786 P.2d 561, 575(Ct.App.1989) (rev. denfrd ).) 
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Therefore. the Cou11 has no difficulty concluding that a commercial transaction constituted 
the <•gravamen" of SIO's lawsuit.6 
Therefore, the Com1 concludes that both Monsanto and WGI, as prevailing parties in 
this litigation, are entitled to an award of reasonable anorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3). 
4. Reasonableness of Attomey Fees. 
Once the Court has identified a statutory or contractual entitlement to attorney 
fees, the Court must determine the amount of attorney fees to award. Rule 54(e)(l) 
charges the Court with the responsibility of awarding a ''reasonable attorney fee[]" when 
attorney fees are provided by statute or contract. This analysis is controlled by Rule 
54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule provides as follows: 
ln the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil 
action it shall consider the following factors in detennining the amount of 
such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
6This conclusion is equally applicable to the claims asserted by SIO againsl Monsanto and SIO for Breach of1he Implied 
Covcnnnt of Oood f'uilh ~no Fnir Dealing, Equilllble Estoppel, Quasi Estoppel, ~nd Tortious Interference with Contract. 
Each of these claims fit within the two (2) prong &nalysis enunciated in Garner. 
l\fll:MO'RANl:lUM OECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS• MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES-7 
Mar. 9. 2012 11:00AM Car;bou County Court 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(l) The nature and length of the professional relationship with die client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted 
Legal Research), if the cou1t finds it was reasonably necessary in 
preparing a pa1ty' s case, 
(L) Any other factor whlch the court deerns appropriate in the particular 
case, 
No. 0146 P. 8/16 
When determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the district court 
must, at a minimum, pwvide a record which establishes that the Court considered the 
factors found in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3). Building Concepts, Ltd v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640, 
645, 759 f>.2d 931, 936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court need not specifically address all of 
the factors contained in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3) in writing, so long as the record clearly indicates 
that the Court considered them all, Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 
P.2d 1227 (1988), 
The Court "has discretion, after considering the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3), to dete1mine the amount of attorney fees that should be awarded.,, Young v. 
Srare Farm M1-1r. Auro Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 122, 128, 898 P.2d 53 (1995). In analyzing a 
trial court's exercise of its discretlon, the appellate courts r~pply an abuse of discretion 
standard. Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471, _, 259 P.3d 617, 624 (2011), In 
application, this means that the appellate court will defer to the lrial court's discretion if: 
"(l) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to 
specific choices; and (3) the court l'eached its decisio11 by an exercise of' reason." Id. 
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quoting Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, L.L. C., 148 Idaho 638, 227 P.3d 
568 (2010). 
As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Action Co/lecrion Services. inc. v. 
Bigham, 146 1daho 286, 290, 192 PJd 1110, 1114 (Ct.App.2008), na court need not 
blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and may disallow fees that were 
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred." ln considering the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), 
the Court may use information from its "own knowledge and experience," 01· from 
information contained in the record, or infol'mation supplied by the party requesting the 
fees. Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Ct.App,1985), 
The Cou1i has considered the factors set forth in 54(e)(3), and specifically 
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C) (D), (E), (G), (1), (J), (K), and (L). 7 
a. Attorneys nnd Pnralegnl Rntcs. 
First, the Court finds that the hourly rates for attorney fees and paralegal fees by 
Monsanto )s counsel are reasonable when compared to those normally and customarily 
charged by counsel in Southeastern Idaho. 
This Court has previously held that n reasonable and customary rate for seasoned trial 
counsel in Southeastern ldaho was between $185,00 and $225.00 per hour,8 See Hard Rock 
Horizontal Boring, Inc. v. Edstrom Construe/ion, Inc. and insurance of /he West, Franklin 
County Case No, CV-2006-342, Memorandum Decision and Order on Attorney Fees and 
7 Although the Court considered subparagraphs (F) and (H), both were found to be of Iii.tie assistance to the Corn1 
in detem1ining a reasont1ble am(lunt for lhe ~ttomey fees in this particular case. Further, there was little, if any, 
discussion regarding these facrors in either the bnefing or the pa1iies' argument. 
~At oral argument, Counsel for SIO argued that local counsel, Dpvid P. Gllrdner, when queried by counsel regarding the 
reosonnblcness of counsel for Monsnnto's Mtomey fee rate, responded lhnt it WM a little Mt high. Such a conclusion 
would not be consistent with this Court's experlenc<: and pccvious dctcnninations. It is also noteworthy !hat !his Coun 
recently received a cost bill from Mr. Gardner's firm on a Motion 10 Compel, rcflccllng that a colleague of Mr. 
Gardner's, Ed Cn1her, was charging attorney fees of$200.00 per hour in the cftse of D,L £vans Bank v, Cli:i1·k. Bnnnock 
Co1mty Case CV-2010 1114. The Court would note that Mr. Cather, while very competent and skilled, has considerably 
less experience than either Mr. Budge or Mr. Nye:. 
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Costs, p. 13. The Court has previously upheld requests for attorney fees by seasoned tdal 
counsel in other proceedings. These awards include the following: Randall C. Budge 
($195.00 per hour in Stoddard v. Beus, Caribou County Case CV-2009-0000357; Ron Kerl 
($200.00 per hour in Jimerson v. Boyack, Franklin County Case CV 2010-286); James 0. 
Reid ($225.00 per hour in Shore v. Bokides, Franklin County Case CV-2008-327); Michael 
D. Gaffney ($200.00 per hour in Hard Rock Horizontal Bo1·ing Inc. v. Edstrom Consrrucrion, 
Inc., Franklin County Case No. CV-2006-342); and Matthew L. Walter ($185.00 in Dmyl 
Godfl'ey and Sons v. Scoular Inc., Caribou County Case No. CV-2009-191). This is a small, 
but representative, sample offee awards that this Court has considered and granted.9 
The Court also concludes that the rates charged by associate attorneys and paralegals 
are also reasonable and within the range charged by counsel with similar experience and 
paralegas in Southeastern Idaho. See Court's decisions in Hard Rock Horizontal Boring !rte. 
v. Edstrom Construction, Inc. and Insurance of the Wesr, Franklin Counry Case No. CV" 
2006-342 and Dmyl Gortfrey and Sons v. Scoular Inc., Caribou County Case No. CV"2009-
191. 
Second, the Court also concludes that the hourly rates for attorney fees and paralegal 
fees by WGI's cotmsel are reasonable, SIO argues that WGl's attorney fees are not 
reasonable fo1· the geographic area, Southeastern Idaho, and relies upon the case of Lerrunich 
IThe Court does no1 flnd persuasive SlO's compll.rlsoo between the rates charged by Monsanto's counsel's film in the 
present case nnd the rntes it chnrged in Shields v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC. There can be a mullitudc of reasons why n law 
finn would charge one (I) client a different rale than another. Because of the competition for the work and industry 
st!l!lclards, law firms frequenlly ch~rge less for h1sun1nce defense work than other commercial Jilig:ation. It was 
represented lhal Monsanlo and its law tirm in lhis litiga1ion have a longstanding attomey/clien\ relationship. It is 
certQinly expected in a longstanding relationsJ!ip, where both p~rties hnve a mutuf11 salisfoction regarding the relationship 
11nd the qwlity of the worl: product, !hl\t there will be an expectation that there will be periodic reviews and increases in 
the cos! of services. Whereas other clients, who may be new or less cs1oblishcd1 may be charged a lesser rate to retiiin 
the work Md achieve the recognition necessary for long term re1enlion nnd es1ablishmen1 of the relationship. As such, 
comparing the rntcs charged In one (I) cnse, such as Shields v. GMAC Mortgage, LlC, is certainly not dc1em1inativc and 
without more informal ion is of marginal value in the Court's lR.C.P. 54( e){3) analysi$, 
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v. Lelluntch, 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008) (Lertunich) to support this contention. 
However, in Letruntch, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The bottom line in an award of attorney fees is reasonableness.... The 
pertinent geographic area is the areu from which it would be reasonable to 
obtain counsel. Judicial Districts were drawn in order to facilitate court 
administration, not to provide a factor for determining a reasonable attorney 
fee. Attorneys routinely practice Jaw in more than one judicial district. 
145 Idaho at 750-51. This Court concludes that it ls not umeasonable, considering the facts 
of this case and the factors outlined in J.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), for WOI to obtain counsel from 
Boise, Idaho to represent its interest in this proceeding. The amount in controversy was 
alleged to be in excess of $25,000>000.00. In light of the potential exposure, one cannot be 
faulted in seeking out competent and qualified counsel. The Court concludes that it was not 
unreasonable, in light of the issues in dispute and the amount in controversy, for WGI to seek 
out counsel that it had a longstanding relationship with, as well as a high level of confidence 
and trust. Similarly it would not be unreasonable in a case such as this to seek out counsel in 
Salt Lake City, utah. Thls Court has been involved in complex litigation with counsel from 
both Salt Lake City, Utah and Boise, Idaho. The Court concludes that the rates charged by 
WGPs counsel in th.is case, are consistent wlth the rates charged by Boise and Salt Lake City 
Counsel, These include Hawley Trnxell Ennis & Hawley (separate litigation); Elam Burke, 
PA; Moffat Thomas Banett Rock & Fields; and Ringei-t Law Chartered (Boise firms) and 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker; Dart Admson & Donovan; Durham Jones & Pinegar, P,C,; and 
Van Cott> Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy (Salt Lake City Firms). 
b. Reason!lblcness of Attorney Fees 
The Court .finds, upon a complete and exhaustive revlew of the attorney foes 
Monsanto paid to its counsel in defense of this litigation, as well as the factors set fo1th in 
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I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) as addressed above, that Monsanto's claimed fees will be reduced. 
Monsanto has requested that it receive attorney and paralegal fees in the sum of$106,714.50. 
See Monsanto's Memorandum of Fees and Costs, p.2. The support for this request for 
attorney fees is contained in Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Randall C. Budge in Support of 
Motion for Fees and Costs. Again, after consideration of the factors set fmth in I.R.C.P. 
54(e) and a complete review of the time records, the Court will award Monsanto the sum of 
$76,928.50 in attorney fees. The Court concludes that this is a reasonable sum for attorney 
fees expended by Monsanto to defend this litigation and obtain dismissal of SIO's various 
claims by way of summary judgment. 
It ls not the intent of tbe Court to go through and itemize, entry by entry, how the 
Court reached this dete1mination. However, the Court will attempt to give some insight by 
way of example. The Court determined that some time entries appeared to be excessive 
based upon the work product in the Court's file and this Court's experience with what time 
should be expended on these types of issues. 10 The Cou1i, in evaluating the entire cost bill, 
detennined that there appeared to be instances of duplication of tlme and effort and the Couit 
made appropriate adjustments. There were time entries that the CoUit concluded were more 
clerical or paralegal in nature and therefore, more properly the function of clerical staff rather 
than attorneys. 11 There were many entries which were block billed in such a manner that it 
made it extremely difficult for the Court to determine whether the amounts billed were 
reasonable in light of the work recorded. In some instances, the Court made what it felt to be 
1°The Courl reduced !he lime assoclaled with preparation of lhe summary jndgmenl motion. [n some instances it 
appeared thftl this work was duplica1ive and excessive. The slll!le can be said for prepar~tion of discovery nod fei;:~ipl 
nnd review of discovery respons~s from SlO. Again, !here nppeared to excessive work !'Ind often mulliple nttorneys were 
working m1 the same discovery, in some instances three (3) different auomeys. 
11The majority of these reductions, but not all, involvQd what SIO referenced to be a "massive indexing'' project 
undertaken by Mork Schnefer. TI1e Court agrees that this project did ftppeor 10 be a project more ill llne with the 
functions of n paralegal and lhe Court reduced sixty-seven (61) of these hours from Mr. Schaefer's attorney rate ro the 
s1nndaro por!llegal r11te of SS5.00 per hour, 
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appropriate adjustments. In a very few instances there were billings that appeared to have 
been inconectly billed to this file. 12 
In considering the factors set forth in l.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) generally, the time and labor 
required, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the amount involved and 
the results obtained, the Court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion and with 
knowledge and understanding of the applicable legal standards, that a reasonable attorney 
fee in the arnmmt of $76,928.50 'Will be awcu·ded to Monsanto as the prevailing party in its 
litigation with SIO, pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3). 
The Cmnt also finds, upon a complete and exhaustive review of the attorney fees 
WGI paid to its cotinsel ln defense of this litigation, as well as the factors set f011h in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3) as addressed above, that WGPs fees will be reduced. WGI has requested that it 
receive attorney and paralegal fees in the sum of $103,310.88. See WGPs Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees p.3. The support for this request for attorney fees is contained in 
Exhibit "E'' to the Affidavit of Eugene A. Ritti in in Support of Washington Group 
International's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees. Again, after consideration of the factors 
set fmth in I.R.C.P. 54(e) and a complete review of the time records, the Court will award 
WGI the sum of $85,200,00 in attorney fees. The Court concludes that this is a reasonable 
sum for attorney fees expended by WGI to defend this litigation and obtain dismissal of 
SI O's various claims asserted against it by wciy of summary judgment. 
As with the Court's analysis regarding adjustments made to Monsanto's request for 
attorney fees, the Court will not itemize, entry by entry, how the Comt reached this 
12Two suctt instances are 1he time entries on August 8, 2011 ~nd September 14, 201 l. The first of these enr.ries retlec!s 11 
"telephone conference nnd letter to R. Ling - follow up on B~sterechea Ternpoflll)I Ace¢ss Agreement" and the second, 
n time entry on September 14, 2011, where the lime entry reflects, "communicate (out.side counsel) - telephone 
conference with and letter 10 D. Howell and Pacificorp counsel reg~rding remov11l of irrelevant record material l\'om 
Appellate record." 
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detennination, However, the Court similarly determined that some time entries appeared to 
be excessive based upon the work product in the Cou1t's file nnd this Court's experience with 
what time should be expended on these types of issues. See footnote 9. The Court, in 
evaluating the entire cost bill, detennlned that there appeared to be instances of duplication of 
time a11d eftort and the Court made appropriate adjustments. There were time entries that the 
Court concluded were more clerical or paralegal in nature and therefore more properly the 
function of clerical staff rather than attorneys, There were many entries which were block 
billed in such a manner that it made it extremely difficult for the Court to determine whether 
the amounts billed were reasonable in light of the work recorded. 13 1n some instances the 
Court made what it felt to be appropriate adjustment. 
In considering the factors set forth in l.R.C,l?, 54(e)(3) generally, the time and labor 
required, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the amount involved and 
the results obtained, the Court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion and with 
knowledge and understanding of the applicable legal standards, that a reasonable attorney 
fee in the amount of $85,200,00 will be awarded to Monsanto as the prevailing party In its 
litigation with SIO, pursuant to J.C. § 12-120(3). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, and pursuant to Rule 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Idaho Code §12-120(3), the Court concludes that Monsanto and WGI 
are both the prevailing pru.ty in their respective litigation with SlO. As the prevailing party in 
this litigation, Monsanto's nnd WGI's request for costs and attorney fees are GRANTED. 
Based upon the reasoning set forth above, the Cou1t concludes that Monsanto is entitled to an 
1lHowcvcr, i11 mnny instances where block billing occurred, 1hc block bill was broken down within the entry into 
multiple lasks with an appropriate time entry for each task. This was noted and appreclnted by the Court. 
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award of costs in the sum of $1,143.92. Likewise, WG! is entitled to an award of costs in 
the sum of $1,281.83. Jn addition, as the prevailing party in this litigation, Monsanto is 
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to J.C. §12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 
54(e) in the sum of $76,9l8.50. WGI is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees 
pursuant to LC. §12-120(3) and 1.R.C.P. 54(e) in the sum of$8S,200.00. 
This results in a total award of costs and attorney fees in favor of Monsanto and 
against SIO in the amount of $78,072.42 and a total award of costs and attorney fees in 
favor of WGI against SIO in the amount of $86,481.83. 14 The Court, upon submission of 
an appropriate form of judgment pursuant to l,R,C,P 77( d), reflecting the foregoing award 
of costs and attomey fees, will review and sign the same. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 8th day of March 2012. 
~#.~ 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
14The Co1lrt recognizes thnt this matter was resolved 111 the summary judgment stnge. This issue was raised and argued 
by SIO in support of ils claims that the al10rncy fees of both parties nrc excessive for a case which wns conclude<! al \he 
sumrniiry judgment siage. However, the Court also notes thnt this matter involved cl11ims of SIO wherein it claimed 
damages in excess of $25,000,000,00. Significant effort was expended by bolh Monsanto and WGI to defend against 
these clnims. Despite the fact that Monsanto and WGl were dismissed incident to summary judgment, one cannot expect 
them ro rely 11po11 obtaining summ11ry judgment. In orhet words ir was 11or only pruoent, bu1 necessary ihat they continue 
10 prepare for trial while purSuing summary judgment. 
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.JUDGMENT - Page 1 
CASE NO. CV-2009-366 
JUDGMENT 
Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motions for Costs and 
Attorney Fees entered on March 8, 2012 in the above captioned case ("Memorandum Decision"), 
the Court awarded attorney fees and costs against Plaintiff Silicon International Ore, LLC and 
in favor of Defendant Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") in the amount of $78,072.42, and also 
in favor of Defendant Washington Group International, Inc. ("WGl") in the amount of 
$86,481.83. Based upon the Memorandum Decision and the record herein, Defendants 
Monsanto and WGI are entitled to Judgment according to law for said amounts together with 
interest at the statutory rate from March 8, 2012, until paid. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That judgment is hereby entered against Plaintiff Silicon International Ore, LLC 
in favor of Defendant Monsanto in the sum of SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND 
SEVENTY-TWO AND 42/100 DOLLARS ($78,072.42) lawful money of the United States of 
America together with interest at the statutory rate from March 8, 2012, until said Judgment and 
all post-judgment interest, fees and costs are paid. 
2. That judgment is hereby entered against Plaintiff Silicon International Ore, LLC 
in favor of Defendant WGI in the sum of EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED 
EIGHTY-ONE AND 83/100 DOLLARS ($86,481.83) lawful money of the United States of 
America together with interest at the statutory rate from March 8, 2012, until said Judgment and 
all post-judgment interest, fees and costs are paid. 
3. The Clerk is directed to issue such Writs of Execution, Orders for Possession, 
Writs of Assistance and/or other such documents and/or orders as necessary to enforce and 
effectuate the ten11s of this Judgment. 
4. Defendants Monsanto and WGI are further entitled to recover all additional costs 
incun-ed after the date of this Judgment for execution and enforcement of this Judgment as may 
hereafter approved by the Court, which amount shall be deemed added to the Judgment and 
collected by the Sheriff, in addition to the amount stated herein in favor of Monsanto and WGl, 
under applicable law including, but not limited to, Idaho Code § 12-120(5). 
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LET EXECUTION lSSUE HEREON. 
DATED this )iO fl:! day of March, 2012. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CARIBOU } SS. MITCHELL W. BRO\VN 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOll-JG IS A FULL TRUE ANoDistrict Judge 
CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGIMAL AS THE SAME APPEARS OF RECORD OR 
ON FILE IN THIS OFFICE. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND AND AFFIX»~ 
g:~1g~l SE/Y/JJ'2l.FFICE
2
;T l~A SPRINGS, IDAHO, THIS ..q..'._ 
~/:;ecla Ma~r.?remas 
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] HEREBY CERTIFY that on this A~'ff:!_ day of mµc,,/.._,, ' 2012, 1 served a true 
and complete copy of the foregoing document on the following persons in the manner indicated: 
Randall C. Budge 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
David P. Gardner 
Moffatt Thomas Banett Rock & Fields 
412 W. Center Street, Ste 2000 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0817 
Barry N. Johnson 
Daniel K. Brough 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere 
3165 East Millrock Drive, Ste 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Eugene A. Ritti 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
877 Main Street, Ste 1000 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
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